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Article

Is the Corporate Control Market Segmented?

Ding Du and Mason Gerety
The Journal of Private Equity Summer 2019, jpe.2019.1.078; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3905/jpe.2019.1.078
Ding Du
is a senior financial economist in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency at the US Department of the Treasury in Washington, DC
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Mason Gerety
is a professor of finance at the W.A. Franke College of Business, Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff, AZ
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Abstract

Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) propose a segmented-market perspective. We extend the literature by directly testing if a segmented-market perspective helps explain the premium difference between private and public acquisitions. Empirically, we follow Fidrmuc et al. (2012) and use a matched sample design. We find that private acquirers do not pay less than public acquirers when controlling for the selling mechanism (which characterizes different corporate control markets) as well as the effects of outliers. Our results suggest that premium differences between private and public acquisitions may be more consistent with a segmented-market perspective as opposed to the agency explanation of Bargeron et al. (2008).

TOPICS: Private equity, Performance measurement

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The Journal of Private Equity: 23 (1)
The Journal of Private Equity
Vol. 23, Issue 1
Winter 2019
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Is the Corporate Control Market Segmented?
Ding Du, Mason Gerety
The Journal of Private Equity Apr 2019, jpe.2019.1.078; DOI: 10.3905/jpe.2019.1.078

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Is the Corporate Control Market Segmented?
Ding Du, Mason Gerety
The Journal of Private Equity Apr 2019, jpe.2019.1.078; DOI: 10.3905/jpe.2019.1.078
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