RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Is the Corporate Control Market Segmented?
JF The Journal of Private Equity
FD Institutional Investor Journals
SP jpe.2019.1.078
DO 10.3905/jpe.2019.1.078
A1 Ding Du
A1 Mason Gerety
YR 2019
UL https://pm-research.com/content/early/2019/04/14/jpe.2019.1.078.abstract
AB Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) propose a segmented-market perspective. We extend the literature by directly testing if a segmented-market perspective helps explain the premium difference between private and public acquisitions. Empirically, we follow Fidrmuc et al. (2012) and use a matched sample design. We find that private acquirers do not pay less than public acquirers when controlling for the selling mechanism (which characterizes different corporate control markets) as well as the effects of outliers. Our results suggest that premium differences between private and public acquisitions may be more consistent with a segmented-market perspective as opposed to the agency explanation of Bargeron et al. (2008).Topics: Private equity, Performance measurement