RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Private Equity IPOs: <em>Five Executive Compensation Traps</em>
	       <br/>
	       <em>to Avoid</em>
JF The Journal of Private Equity
FD Institutional Investor Journals
SP 23
OP 25
DO 10.3905/jpe.2013.16.3.023
VO 16
IS 3
A1 Julie Casella
A1 Peter Miterko
YR 2013
UL https://pm-research.com/content/16/3/23.abstract
AB For private equity (PE) funds, an initial public offering (IPO) is often an attractive portfolio company exit strategy. However, since the 2008 recession, PE exits typically have taken place over a significantly longer period—usually years after the IPO is launched. As a result, funds must deal with the complex set of public company considerations around executive compensation in the post-Dodd–Frank world, including shareholder advisory votes, shifting governance guidelines of proxy advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis &amp; Company (Glass Lewis), and the abrupt change that often occurs when the portfolio company ceases to be a “control” company. Before, during, and for sometime after the IPO, the PE sponsor will control the compensation committee. The authors believe that careful planning by committee members, begun well before the IPO is launched, can help committees avoid the significant executive compensation “traps” of Dodd–Frank.TOPICS: Private equity, legal/regulatory/public policy, manager selection